GDP per capita is usually used to proxy for the quality of life of individuals living in different countries. However, welfare is also affected by quantity of life, as represented by longevity. This paper incorporates longevity into an overall assessment of the evolution of cross-country inequality, and shows that it is quantitatively important. The absence of reduction in crosscountry inequality up to 1990's noticed in previous work is in stark contrast with the reduction in inequality after incorporating gains in longevity. Throughout the post-war period, health contributed to significantly reduce welfare inequality across countries. The paper derives valuation formulas for infra-marginal changes in longevity and computes a "full" growth rate that incorporates the gains in health experienced by 96 countries for the period between 1960 and 2000. Incorporating longevity gains changes traditional results; countries starting with lower income tended to grow faster than countries starting with higher income. We estimate an average yearly growth in "full-income" of 4.1 percent for the poorest 50% countries in 1960, of which 1.7 percentage points are due to health, as opposed to a growth of 2.6 percent for the richest 50% countries, of which only 0.4 percentage points are due to health. Additionally, we decompose changes in life expectancy into changes attributable to thirteen broad groups of causes of death and three age groups. We show that mortality from infectious, respiratory and digestive diseases, congenital, perinatal, and "ill-defined" conditions, mostly concentrated before age 20 and between ages 20 and 50, is responsible for most of the reduction in life expectancy inequality. At the same time, the recent effect of AIDS, together with reductions in mortality after age 50 -due to nervous system, senses organs, heart and circulatory diseases -contributed to increase health inequality across countries.
Introduction
Although GDP per capita is usually used as a proxy for the quality of life in different countries, material gain is obviously only one of many aspects of life that enhance economic well-being. Overall economic welfare depends on both the quality and the quantity of life: yearly income and the number of years over which this income is enjoyed. Recent estimates suggest that longevity has been a quantitatively important component of the overall gain in welfare in the US during the twentieth century (Cutler and Richardson, 1997; Nordhaus, 2003; and Murphy and Topel, 2003 ; similar evidence for Sweden is presented by Burström, Johannesson, and Diderichsen, 2003) . This paper analyzes whether gains in life expectancy have also been an important determinant of the evolution of welfare inequality across countries.
A vast literature has investigated the evolution of the cross-country dispersion in income per-capita, and whether poor countries tend to grow faster than rich ones (see, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; de la Fuente, 1997; Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992; Quah, 1996; and Parente and Prescott, 1993) . All these studies give virtually the same results, namely, that income inequality across countries was not reduced during most of the post-war period.
In contrast, evidence suggests that cross-country inequality in several different dimensions of health was substantially reduced throughout the twentieth century (see, for example, Bourguignon and Morrison, 2002; Goesling and Firebaugh, 2004; Neumayer, 2003; Sap and Smith, 2002; and Younger, 2001) . So the trends in income and health inequality have indeed been strikingly different in the recent past, and, therefore, trusting on income alone to infer the evolution of welfare inequality across countries may lead to misleading results.
We illustrate the cross-country trends in health and income inequality between 1960 and 2000 in Table 1 . Income is measured with the gross domestic product per-capita adjusted for terms of trade (Penn World Tables 6.1), and health is measured by life expectancy at birth (World Development Indicators). The sample includes 96 countries, comprising more than 82% of the world population in 1960.
The table shows several dispersion measures (weighted by country populations) for income per capita and life expectancy at birth, for the years 1960, 1990 and 2000 . The last row presents the regression to the mean over the previous period: the coefficient of a regression of the change in the variable on its initial level (the natural logarithm, in the case of income per capita).
These data, as previous research has found, show that regressions to the mean, Gini coefficients, coefficients of variation, and other measures of inequality do not show evidence of reduction in income inequality across countries up to the 1990's.
1 During the 1990's, the economic success of China and India, together with their huge populations, reduced the crosscountry dispersion in income per capita (without these two countries, the sample shows increasing inequality between 1960 and 1990, and stable inequality between 1990 and 2000; this is also in good part behind the results obtained in Sala-i-Martin, 2002) . Table 1 also presents the same dispersion measures usually used for income for the case of life expectancy at birth. In this case, the evidence is diametrically opposite. By any measure, life expectancy inequality declines substantially over the entire period. Countries starting with low longevity tended to gain more in life expectancy than countries starting with high longevity.
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The regression to the mean coefficient implies that, on average, each additional 10 years of life expectancy in 1960 were associated with a reduction of roughly 6 years in life expectancy gains in the following 40 years. But the decline in health inequality is concentrated entirely between 1960 and 1990 . After that, the effects of AIDS in Africa are felt, and life expectancy inequality increases slightly between 1990 and 2000.
These two patterns suggest that incorporating longevity into an overall assessment of the changes in cross-country inequality may be important, as the extent of changes in income inequality is small compared to the changes in life expectancy inequality. In addition, changes in income and health inequality have followed completely different patterns, suggesting that a large component of the recent changes in health is orthogonal to income.
This paper tries to account for the impact of longevity on the evolution of welfare across countries during the last few decades. The use of per capita income to evaluate welfare improvements assumes that it reflects the level of economic welfare enjoyed by the average person, but it has well-known shortcomings such as not measuring non-market goods and home-1 As pointed out by Friedman (1992) , zero-mean measurement error in the initial period income tends to generate spurious negative correlation, artificially increasing the degree of regression to the mean. Even with this bias, it is not uncommon for one to obtain a positive coefficient in these regressions. 2 As opposed to the negative impact of measurement error on regression to the mean in income, there are reasons to believe measurement error has a positive impact in the case of longevity. An upward bias in poor country life expectancies is commonly believed to occur due to incomplete data from rural areas. However, this upward bias has been reduced by improved collection of mortality statistics in poor countries in the last decades. The reduction in upward bias for poor countries would induce a positive, as opposed to negative, bias on the regression towards the mean.
production. We try to fill in one of those gaps, by incorporating survival rates throughout a person's life. In particular, we consider the evolution of welfare for a hypothetical life-cycle individual (HLCI). A HLCI for a given year and country is defined to have the income per capita of the country in every year of life and to face throughout life the survival probabilities determined by the country's cross-sectional survival curve. Our results refer to inequality across different societies as measured by differences in welfare of this hypothetical individual.
We estimate the monetary value of longevity gains and add it to the observed gains in income per capita. This gives the change in income that would have been observed if all the welfare gain in the period had taken the form of income growth. We then analyze how the growth in this "full-income," including both changes in income per year and the value of years enjoyed, changes the traditional results regarding cross-country inequality. Our main result is that incorporating longevity changes the conclusions related to the evolution of welfare inequality over time: countries became significantly more equal between 1960 and 2000. In particular, we estimate an average yearly growth in "full-income" of 2.8 percent, of which roughly three-quarters are due to income per capita and one-quarter to longevity. However, for the poorest 50% countries in 1960, there is an average yearly growth of 4.1 percent, of which 1.7 percentage points are due to health, as opposed to the richest 50% countries, for which the average yearly growth in "full-income" is 2.6 percent, and only 0.4 percentage points are due to health.
We also disaggregate mortality data by age groups and causes of death to try to understand the determinants of the cross-country reduction in life expectancy inequality, and the diseases responsible for the observed gains in welfare. For each age group and cause of death, we compute a counterfactual measure of the mortality rate that would be observed in the 1990's had mortality rates by all causes and at all ages but the ones in question remained at their 1960's values. This approach allows us to estimate the life expectancy gain attributable to reductions in mortality at each age and by each specific cause of death. We show that changes in mortality due to infectious, respiratory and digestive diseases, congenital and perinatal conditions, mostly concentrated at early ages, are the most important factors determining the reduction in life expectancy inequality. In other words, mortality at early ages by these causes of death fell more rapidly in poor than in rich countries. At the same time, reductions in mortality due to nervous system, senses organs, heart and circulatory diseases worked towards increasing inequality, as mortality among the elderly by these causes fell more rapidly in rich rather than in poor countries. The large changes in mortality observed in the developing world are consistent with the interpretation that poor countries absorbed technology and knowledge previously available in rich countries, at relatively low costs, while most of the changes in mortality in developed countries took advantage of recent developments on the frontier of medical technology.
Our paper relates to the original work of Usher (1973) , which was developed further by Rosen (1988) and Murphy and Topel (2003) . Our work also relates to existing measures created by the United Nations that attempt to incorporate non-material aspects into broader measures of well-being (UNDP, 2002) . However, as discussed at length in Philipson and Soares (2002) , our methods differ in that preferences revealed by market behavior, and not arbitrary assumptions from governmental or international agencies, dictate the relative importance of non-material aspects in the overall evaluation of welfare.
The structure of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 discusses the methodology used to value longevity gains, extending previous analysis of marginal changes in longevity to consider valuations of infra-marginal changes. Section 3 contains our basic results on the reduction in inequality induced by considering longevity gains. Section 4 considers age and cause-specific contributions to this reduction in inequality. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Valuing Infra-marginal Changes in Longevity

Theory
Previous work of Usher (1973) , Rosen (1988) , and Murphy and Topel (2003) 
where S(t) is the probability of survival to age t, y(t) is income at t, c(t) consumption at t, and r = ρ is the assumed interest rate. This budget constraint assumes full annuity insurance, or the existence of a complete contingent claims market.
Now consider a given country at two points in time, with lifetime income and survival functions denoted by Y and S, and Y' and S' respectively. We are interested in the infra-marginal income W(S,S') that would give a person in this country the same utility level observed in the first period, but with the mortality rates observed in the second:
The growth rate in the "full" lifetime income that values both the gains in material income and the gains in longevity then corresponds to G= [Y'+ W(S,S') ]/Y -1. This "full" growth rate is thus the standard growth rate added together with the growth rate in income measuring the gains in longevity.
Income can be used to measure material improvements only with a set of assumptions that justify using a single number to portray changes in a country's welfare. Similar simplifying assumptions are needed here to measure the material value equivalent to the life expectancy gains. More precisely, to calibrate the model for commonly available national income and mortality statistics for a given country and year, we consider a hypothetical life-cycle individual (HLCI) who receives the country's income per capita in all years of life and faces throughout life the country's cross-sectional survival function. Under the maintained assumptions, this implies that optimal consumption equals the constant income; c(t) = c = y, so that the indirect utility function can be expressed in terms of the yearly income y as in:
where
is the value of an annuity based on the survival function S. If
w(S,S'
) is the yearly -as opposed to lifetime -income that measures the gain in longevity in a manner similar to before, w satisfies
u(y'+w(S,S'))A(S) = u(y')A(S').
(3') with the corresponding annual "full-income" growth rate g=[y'+w(S,S')]/y-1. The value of longevity gains measured in yearly income is related to the value measured in life-time income
according to W(S,S')=A(S)w(S, S').
The usual critiques of GDP as a measure of "full-income" -that it does not incorporate value of leisure, household production, and non-market goods -also apply to our methodology. In fact, we attempt to fill in one of these gaps, as it relates to homeproduced or non-market health.
Calibration
We here discuss our methods for calibrating the parameters used throughout the empirical analysis to estimate the infra-marginal willingness to pay for gains in survival rates
w(S,S').
The monetary value of the gains in longevity measured in annual income and the growth rate in "full-income" are determined implicitly from expression (3'). If we can invert the instantaneous utility function u(.), they can be written as:
As stressed by Rosen (1988) , two dimensions of the instantaneous utility function affect the willingness to pay for extensions in life expectancy. The first is the substitutability of consumption in different periods of life, i.e. the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, and the second is the value of being alive relative to being dead. We calibrate the following functional form for the instantaneous utility function to capture these two different dimensions:
The parameter α determines the level of annual consumption at which the individual would be indifferent between being alive or dead, arising from the normalization of the utility of death to zero. If the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution γ is larger than 1, then α is negative. With expression (5) and this functional form, we obtain closed form solutions for w and g.
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The set of parameters (α,γ,r) needed to compute these values can be calibrated from other parameters more commonly estimated in the "value of life" and consumption literatures. More precisely, we have that
, where ) (
is the elasticity of the instantaneous utility function, often discussed and estimated in empirical studies of compensating differentials for occupational mortality risks. In particular, Murphy and Topel (2003, p.23) , estimate ε to equal 0.346. Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999, p.614) , after exhaustively reviewing the estimates from the empirical literature on the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (γ), suggest that it is slightly above unity. Using γ = 1.250, ε = 0.346 and c = $26,365, we calibrate the value of α to equal -16.2. 4, 5 We assume the annual interest rate r to be 0.03.
The Effect of Life Expectancy on World Inequality
We use expression (5) we use life expectancy at birth numbers from the World Bank Development Indicators, and apply the deterministic version of the methodology discussed in the previous section. Table 2 presents the results for the value of longevity gains and the growth rate of "fullincome," together with income and life expectancy statistics, using the value of the parameters derived in the previous section. The value of longevity gains is presented in two forms: yearly income (w), and total discounted lifetime value (W). Results are presented for the regions of the world according to the World Bank classification, and for the groups of poorest and richest countries in 1960 (population-weighted averages). 3 The closed form expression for w is:
The value of consumption is the value of US per capita income in 1990 in the PWT 6.1 dataset, matching the year in which Murphy and Topel (2003) estimate ε using US data. With the calibrated utility parameters, an individual with annual income equal to $353 would be indifferent between being alive or dead. The only values of the GDP per capita variable (adjusted for terms of trade, rgdptt) in the PWT 6.1 dataset below $353 are the ones for the Democratic Republic of Congo between 1994 and 1997. 5 Notice that the functional form adopted is flexible enough to accommodate an income-elasticity of the willingness to pay for changes in life expectancy that actually changes with income. So the calibration using US data is not limiting in the sense of imposing a willingness to pay that does not belong to the less-developed countries we want to analyze. If we look at the income-elasticity of the marginal willingness to pay for life extensions, it varies from 1.2 for average levels of income per capita (around $10,000 in 2000), to 1.9 and 3.8 for, respectively, $1,000 and $500 of income per capita. Therefore, the functional form adopted is flexible enough to identify underlying preference parameters that, in principle, can be used irrespectively of the income level. Viscusi and Aldi (2003) make an extensive review of estimates of the "value of a statistical life" around the world. For the developed countries included in their review, our parameterization implies "values of a statistical life" between $1.5 and $2.5 million. These are typically in the lower range of estimates discussed in Viscusi and Aldi (2003) . If anything, our parameterization will tend to underestimate the value of reductions in mortality rates.
The average value of longevity gains in terms of annual income for the entire sample is $1,627. The value is somewhat higher for the richest countries: $2,076 against $1,456 (in international prices). But the relation between these values and the initial income is much higher for poor countries, where it reaches 163%, as opposed to 29% for the richest half of the sample.
This tendency is also reflected in the growth rate of "full-income." In this case, since the initial income level is lower for developing countries, the difference between the richest and poorest countries is reversed: the average yearly growth for the top half of the sample is 2.6%, against 4.1% for the bottom half.
The regional profile of the value of longevity changes also reflects this trend. In terms of the yearly growth in "full-income," East Asia and the Pacific, Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia arise as the top performers. Apart from the well-known development success of the Southeast Asian countries, this also reflects to a great extent the more recent success of China and India, in both the economic and health arenas. But perhaps most striking is the dismal performance of Sub-Saharan Africa, which displays the lowest growth rate of "full-income" in the sample. As we discussed before, this is partly due to the reversal of the gains in life expectancy that was brought about by the outbreak of the AIDS epidemic in the 1990's.
Nevertheless, the size of the Sub-Saharan population is relatively small when compared to the other developing regions, and the net effect of health is to reduce overall inequality.
This indicates that, unlike income changes, longevity changes since 1960 reduced the disparity in welfare across countries. Table 3 explores this point further by repeating the same income dispersion measures presented in Table 1 , and by additionally calculating the same statistics for " full-income" in 1990 and 2000 (taking 1960 as the base period). As the Table   shows, The ideal independent variable in the right-hand side of this regression should be a measure of "full-income in 1960." Since the approach discussed in section 2 does not allow us to calculate the value of given levels of life expectancy, but only the value of changes in life expectancy, we are forced to use the 1960 value of income per capita rather than "full-income."
As long as the income-elasticity of the value of life is not much below unity, using some measure of "full-income" in this regression would unambiguously increase the degree of convergence since richer countries in 1960 also had higher life expectancy.
These results indicate reduction in welfare inequality throughout most of the post-war period, in the sense that countries with higher initial income tended to have significantly lower subsequent welfare gains. Incomes 100% higher in 1960 were associated, on average, with "fullincome" growth rates 10% lower in the following 30 years, and 26% lower in the following 40
years. This result is not surprising, given the negative correlation between life expectancy gains and income. As long as the income elasticity of value of life is not much above unity, any value attached to longevity would work towards increasing convergence. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) conclude, from various types of evidence, that this elasticity is less than unity, but their results for countries are greatly affected by a couple of extreme observations for India. Without these observations, Becker and Elias (2003) get an elasticity of about unity.
The evidence presented here also indicates that the relative importance of health improvements, when compared to income gains, was systematically higher for the developing world. Overall, the evidence shows that longevity changes in the period between 1960 and 2000 worked towards reducing the disparity in welfare across countries. The actual reduction in disparity depends on the specific values of the parameters α and γ; that is, on the relative importance of quantity and quality of life. But, nevertheless, the qualitative role played by mortality reductions, and the fact that their impact on welfare was quantitatively important, should be obvious.
These results would be even stronger if we accounted for expenditures on health and R&D, because part of the gains in life expectancy is driven by these expenditures. Since most of these expenditures are undertaken by the developed world, the share of truly exogenous reductions in mortality is certainly higher for the less-developed countries. 6 Therefore, convergence in welfare would be higher if the endogenous part of longevity gains were netted out.
The Causes of Changes in Mortality Inequality
Cross-country life expectancy convergence would follow if countries shared the same concave health production technology, as the international evidence suggests, and spent the same on health. Countries with higher initial mortality then would have larger mortality reductions because they have much higher returns on investments in health than do countries with lower mortality.
However, the shift in the income-life expectancy profile noticed elsewhere suggests that this is not the whole story, and that a considerable part of the changes in longevity is related to technological improvements (see Preston, 1980; and Soares, 2004) . Stable concave returns to investments in health cannot account for the changing cross-sectional relationship between income and life expectancy. Moreover, since investments in health are much larger for developed than for developing countries -measured either in absolute terms or as shares of income -a stable health production function could not explain the convergence in life expectancy, unless returns to investments in health were implausibly higher for the lessdeveloped world.
Data
To understand the nature of the changes in mortality in the developing world, we decompose the gains in life expectancy into different age groups and causes of death has to be made compatible by matching codes of the different versions of the ICD. As we will be dealing with rather broad groups of causes of death, this will not be a problem.
We define the following thirteen groups of causes of death: R01: infectious diseases; R02: neoplasms; R03: endocrine, metabolic and blood diseases, and nutritional deficiencies; R04: mental disorders; R05: diseases of the nervous system and senses organs; R06: heart and circulatory diseases; R07: respiratory and digestive diseases; R08: urinary and genital diseases;
R09: abortion and obstetric causes; R10: skin and musculoskeletal diseases; R11: congenital anomalies and perinatal period conditions; R12: ill-defined conditions; and R13: accidents, suicides and homicides. The grouping of the codes from the ICD-6/7 and ICD-9 into these thirteen categories is described in the Appendix.
Mortality data by age groups and causes of death for earlier years are available only for a restricted sample of countries. In order to increase cross-country comparability in our dataset, we use the mortality data as ten-year averages centered in the reference years: 1965 corresponds to the average for the period between 1960 and 1969, and 1995 corresponds to the average between 1990 and 1999 (or years available in these intervals). Even after this, the sample includes only 49 countries. 7 The most critical problem with this dataset is that it contains only one Sub-Saharan African country (Mauritius). So we cannot possibly expect this exercise to reveal the effects of AIDS mortality in the later part of the twentieth century. But, as the previous discussion pointed out, the behavior of life expectancy in Sub-Saharan Africa after 1990 immediately reveals the overwhelming effects of AIDS on the recent evolution of mortality across countries. So the real puzzle lies on the reduction on life expectancy inequality prior to 1990, not on the effects of AIDS after that.
In this respect, apart from the absence of Sub-Saharan Africa, there does not seem to be any specific bias induced by the reduced sample. In fact, the experience of the countries included in the sample seems to be quite typical of the cross-country changes in life expectancy observed prior to the arrival of AIDS. In any case, this is a limitation imposed by data availability, and we can do nothing about it. When interpreting the results related to age and cause specific mortality, it is important to keep in mind that they are probably an accurate description of the pre-AIDS experience of technological diffusion from developed to developing countries, but not of the recent experiences of Sub-Saharan Africa and of the extremely poor countries of the world.
Age and Cause-Specific Changes in Life Expectancy
To consider age-specific changes in longevity, define the survival function conditional on
age a according to S(t|a)=S(t)/S(a), for t ≥ a. Any change in the survival function from S to S'
can be decomposed into changes attributable to different age groups. Without loss of generality, consider the age group between ages a and a+i, where a ≤ a+i ≤ t. The survival function that would be observed if only changes in mortality between ages a and a+i had taken place would
be S' a = S(t|a+i)S'(a+i|a)S(a).
This counterfactual survival function gives the probability of survival up to age t according to the probabilities between ages a and a+i observed in the second period, and the probabilities in other age groups observed in the first period. 
Similarly to the case of age-specific mortality changes, this expression gives the survival function that would be observed if only changes in mortality from cause of death k had taken place.
Both these decompositions can be applied to any given survival function, so that applying them sequentially one obtains a counterfactual survival function S' k,a , which simulates the survival function that would be observed if only changes in mortality by one specific cause of death (k) and in one specific age group (between ages a and a+i) had actually taken place.
With the age and cause-specific survival functions S' k,a , we can immediately construct corresponding counterfactual measures of life expectancy, each one defined as 
where ∆L is the change in life expectancy observed between 1965 and 1995. In this respect, we concentrate the analysis on the regression to the mean in life expectancy. The approach outlined above gives a direct decomposition of the overall regression to the mean in life expectancy into the regression to the mean attributable to each cause and age.
By definition, the regression to the mean coefficient is given by a linear regression of ∆L on a 
This expression gives a natural decomposition for the convergence coefficient:
where β k,a is the vector of coefficients of the OLS regression of ∆L k,a on X 65 .
In words, the coefficient of the regression of changes in life expectancy on initial life expectancy levels can be decomposed into coefficients of regressions of cause and age-specific changes in life expectancy on initial life expectancy levels, plus a residual term (β 
Results from the Decomposition of Life Expectancy Changes
Age and cause-specific survival rates are constructed using deaths and population data from the World Health Organization Mortality Database. Mortality rates are assumed to be constant inside the age intervals for which data is tabulated. Table 4 presents the life expectancy changes that can be attributed to each cause of death and each age group, by regions of the world and for the whole sample.
The Table shows that, overall, the most important changes in life expectancy came from diseases of the nervous system and senses organs, respiratory and digestive conditions, congenital anomalies, perinatal period conditions and ill-defined causes. Also, most of these reductions in mortality were concentrated before age 20 or after age 50.
But the composition of these mortality changes in terms of causes of death and age groups was very different across the different regions. Mortality reductions in nervous system and senses organs diseases were very important in Europe and Central Asia and almost irrelevant in the Middle East and North Africa. On the other hand, respiratory and digestive conditions, together with ill-defined causes, were the main factors in determining life expectancy gains for the Middle East and North Africa and for Latin America and the Caribbean, but were much less important for North America, Europe and Asia. At the same time, there are certain diseases that had a relatively small impact on the overall change in life expectancy, but were very important in one particular region. This is the case of heart and circulatory diseases, which had a relatively small overall impact, but were the most important factors determining changes in life expectancy in North America. This is also the case of infectious diseases, which had a significant impact in life expectancy in Latin America and the Caribbean. In order to further understand the differential impact of mortality by different causes and age groups on the evolution of cross-country inequalities in health, we apply the decomposition strategy described in the previous section to the regression to the mean in life expectancy. As mentioned before, regression to the mean in life expectancy can be decomposed into regression to the mean in changes in life expectancy attributable to each cause of death and age group. The coefficient of regression to the mean in this restricted sample is equal to -0.55 (statistically significant at any standard significance level). We run 56 regressions of age and cause-specific changes in life expectancy (13 causes of death, 3 age groups, plus all ages and all causes of death together) on the initial life expectancy level (each one giving one of the β k,a coefficients from the previous section). We then calculate the contribution of the specific age group and cause of death to the overall regression to the mean in life expectancy (β k,a /β). The results are presented in Table 5 .
Out of the thirteen causes of death, five contributed to increased dispersion in life expectancy across countries, meaning that the behavior of mortality due to these causes worked against regression to the mean in life expectancy. Most of these five "divergent" causes of death had virtually no impact on overall health inequality, but two played a considerable role in increasing inequality: mortality by nervous system, senses organs, heart, and circulatory diseases reduced convergence by more than 34% of its actual value. In the case of nervous system and senses organs diseases, mortality reductions were experienced by both developed and developing countries, but the extent of these reductions was considerably larger for developed countries. In terms of heart and circulatory diseases, mortality reductions were considerable for North
America, but basically nonexistent -or even negative -for the rest of the world.
In relation to the causes of death that worked towards reducing health inequality, the action is concentrated in a handful of cases: infectious, respiratory and digestive diseases, congenital anomalies, perinatal period conditions, and "ill-defined" conditions accounted for roughly 133% of the observed regression to the mean. Among these, respiratory and digestive diseases were by far the most important, accounting for 81% of the regression to the mean. Note that this group also includes infectious diseases related to the respiratory tract, such as pneumonia and influenza, and digestive tract diseases such as appendicitis and cirrhosis. The second most important contribution to convergence comes from "ill-defined" causes and conditions. This most likely reflects the relative improvement of medical practice and record keeping behavior in developing countries.
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The age specific pattern of these causes of death is also obvious from the decomposition.
Almost all of the inequality enhancing effect of nervous system and senses organs and heart and circulatory diseases took place via reductions in mortality after age 50. At the same time, the reduction in inequality via respiratory and digestive diseases was almost entirely concentrated before age 20, with some effects still being felt between ages 20 and 50, while infectious 9 The fact that "ill-defined" conditions were relatively more common in developing countries in 1965 tends to underestimate the actual convergence in the other causes of death. This is so because a larger share of the reduction in mortality in developing countries is being attributed to "ill-defined" causes and conditions. Which causes of death suffer the biggest underestimation depends on the correlation between cause of death and misreporting ("illdefined"). We do not deal with this problem.
diseases had similar effects across these two ages groups. Overall, reductions in mortality up to age 20 were responsible for most of the regression to the mean in life expectancy observed in the period, with some additional contribution from changes in life expectancy between ages 20 and 50. In contrast, changes in mortality after age 50 significantly contributed to increase health inequality across countries.
These results support the view that recent reductions in mortality in the developing world have been due in part to the absorption of previously available technologies (for arguments in this direction, see Preston, 1980; and Soares, 2004) . The group of infectious, respiratory and digestive diseases, congenital anomalies, and perinatal period conditions includes the types of diseases for which educational health programs and simple interventions can have large beneficial effects. On the other side of the spectrum, developed countries benefited relatively more from reductions in mortality that required new technological developments, relatively costly change of habits, and expensive surgical interventions (heart, circulatory, and nervous system diseases). The concept is of a developed center that generates health and medical knowledge to be absorbed eventually by the underdeveloped periphery.
Concluding Remarks
This paper shows that life expectancy gains in the forty years between 1960 and 2000 have been an important component of improvements in welfare throughout the world. We estimate the value of the gains in health during this period to be of the same order of magnitude as the gains in income and, for the poorest half of the world, to represent 40% of the overall welfare gains. The effects of health are sufficient to revert the results regarding the evolution of cross-country inequality up to the 1990's. Once health is accounted for, there is a significant reduction in inequality throughout the world up to 1990, and, even with the AIDS epidemic, a much more significant reduction in inequality between 1960 and 2000 than can be perceived from income alone.
The decline in life expectancy inequality can be attributed, to a great extent, to reductions in mortality due to infectious, respiratory and digestive diseases in developing countries.
Nevertheless, some causes of death have actually contributed towards increased health inequality. This is obviously true for AIDS, but it is also true for the cases of nervous system, senses organs, heart and circulatory diseases, for which developed countries took advantage of recent advances on the frontier of medical technology. The ongoing AIDS epidemic in Africa and rising infection rates in Asia, coupled with recent advances in medical technology that are unlikely to soon become available in the developing world, raise the possibility that the post-war trends in health inequality may be reversed in the near future.
Appendix: Classification of ICD Codes into Cause of Death Groups
R01: infectious diseases: icd-6/7 a: a001-a043; icd-6/7 b: b001-b017; icd-9: b01-b07. R02: neoplasms: icd-6/7 a: a044-a060; icd-6/7 b: b018-b019; icd-9: b08-b17. R03: endocrine, metabolic and blood diseases, nutritional deficiencies: icd-6/7 a: a061-a066; icd-6/7 b: b020-b021; icd-9: b18-b20. R04: mental disorders: icd-6/7 a: a067-a069; icd-9: b21. R05: diseases of the nervous system and senses organs: icd-6/7 a: a070-a078; icd-6/7 b: b022-b023; icd-9: b22-b24. R06: heart and circulatory diseases: icd-6/7 a: a079-a086; icd-6/7 b: b024-b029; icd-9: b25-b30. R07: respiratory and digestive diseases: icd-6/7 a: a087-a107; icd-6/7 b: b030-b037; icd-9: b31-b34. R08: urinary and genital diseases: icd-6/7 a: a108-a114; icd-6/7 b: b038-b039; icd-9: b35-b37. R09: abortion and obstetric causes: icd-6/7 a: a115-a120; icd-6/7 b: b040; icd-9: b38-b41. R10: skin and musculoskeletal diseases: icd-6/7 a: a121-a126; icd-9: b42-b43. R11: congenital anomalies and perinatal period conditions: icd-6/7 a: a127-a135; icd-6/7 b: b041-b044; icd-9: b44-b45. R12: ill-defined: icd-6/7 a: a136-a137; icd-6/7 b: b045-b046; icd-9: b46. R13: accidents, suicides and homicides: icd-6/7 a: a138-a150; icd-6/7 b: b047-b050; icd-9: b47-b56. . Inequality measures weighted by country population (abstracting from within country inequality). Sample includes 96 countries, comprising more than 82% of the world population. Regression to the mean is the coefficient of a regression of the change in the natural log of income over the period on its initial level (weighted regressions). Note: Decomposition of life expectancy calculated by the authors based on age and cause specific mortality data from the World Health Organization. Regional averages weighted by country population. Sample includes 49 countries. The total life expectancy change for East Asia & Pacific is so different from the one presented in Table 2 because the sample used here excludes some of the main beneficiaries of the life expectancy gains in the region, such as China, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand.
